The groomed party

The curious case of Ideological Capture, Foreign Influence Networks, and the Transformation of the UK Green Party

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Abstract: This report traces the transformation of the UK Green Party from an environmental pressure group into a vehicle for sectarian Muslim politics, situating that transformation within two longer historical arcs: the Russian strategic exploitation of Western anti-nuclear ideology to create European fossil fuel dependency, and the recurrent pattern — documented from 1979 Iran to Cold War intelligence operations — of Marxist movements forming tactical alliances with Islamist forces, only to be consumed by them. The analysis draws on open-source reporting, parliamentary testimony, government reviews, and declassified intelligence material. The organising thesis is that the Green Party has not been 'turned' by any single actor. It has been *reflexively controlled* — shaped through decades of ideological preparation, electoral desperation, and the convergence of adversarial strategic interests that now align across Moscow, Tehran, and elements of the British Muslim political diaspora. The most dangerous useful idiots are always the sincere ones.

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I. The Logic of Reflexive Control

Before the historical scaffolding, the analytical framework.

In 1965, Soviet mathematician and psychologist Vladimir Lefebvre developed what he called *reflexive control* — a theory for predetermining an adversary's decisions by altering the information environment through which they perceive the world. The potential was immediately recognised by Soviet military and intelligence services and refined over subsequent decades as a cornerstone of what Western analysts would later call hybrid warfare. Major General M.D. Ionov's 1995 military reformulation defined it as a method to "manipulate an opponent's decision-making process in such a way that he voluntarily takes actions that lead to his own defeat."

The elegance of the concept lies in its relationship to authenticity. Reflexive control does not require fabrication or coercion. It requires, as one academic analysis puts it, a "deep study of the enemy's inner nature" — the identification of existing beliefs, anxieties, and commitments that, if correctly amplified or redirected, will produce desired outcomes without any direct intervention. The target makes decisions they believe to be autonomous. In a profound sense, they *are* autonomous. The controller has simply ensured that the information reaching the target's decision-making process consistently points in a preferred direction.

This is not a new insight dressed in Soviet jargon. It is the operating logic behind every sophisticated long-term influence operation, from the KGB's cultivation of Western peace movements during the Cold War to the current, documented exploitation of the Israel-Hamas information environment by Russian and Iranian state networks. The Institute for Strategic Dialogue, tracking state-affiliated accounts across multiple platforms since October 7th 2023, has documented how Iran, Russia, and China have coordinated the amplification of anti-Western, anti-Ukrainian, and anti-Israeli narratives — not through fabricated content alone, but by seizing on genuine grievances and amplifying them toward strategic ends.

The distinction between manufactured and exploited grievance matters enormously for understanding what has happened to the Green Party. The grievances are real. The anti-war sentiment is genuine. The horror at civilian casualties in Gaza is sincere. None of this requires foreign direction. What reflexive control provides is not the sentiment but the *channel* — ensuring that sincere sentiment flows toward political configurations that serve adversarial interests.

Applied to the Green Party, the thesis of this report is precise: Russia did not create the Green Party's anti-nuclear ideology. Iran did not manufacture British Muslim outrage at Gaza. But both adversarial states have operated, over decades and in the present moment, to shape the ideological ecosystem in which these authentic positions have grown — ensuring that the natural development of green politics, and the natural political

activation of British Muslim communities, produces outcomes that serve Moscow's and Tehran's strategic interests without any of the participants needing to be conscious agents of either government.

The word 'groomed' in the title is chosen with this logic in mind. Grooming, like reflexive control, operates through the exploitation of authentic vulnerability. The target's own predispositions do most of the work.

II. Introduction: The Judean People's Front Problem

When the Green Party of England and Wales was pressed in early 2026 about who had actually founded the organisation — now over fifty years old — senior figures were reduced to disputing the precise committee membership of an activist boat voyage to Alaska in 1971. Patrick Moore, early president of Greenpeace Canada and the organisation's most prominent defector, insisted he was there from the beginning. Greenpeace insisted he merely applied for a berth after the founding documents were already signed. Both sides prosecuted the argument with a vigour comically disproportionate to its contemporary relevance. The entire episode has the quality of the Monty Python sketch in which the People's Front of Judea and the Judean People's Front — indistinguishable to any outside observer — expend their revolutionary energy denouncing each other rather than confronting Rome.

The joke, however, is not simply on the combatants. The pettiness of the founding dispute obscures something of much greater strategic and constitutional significance: while Green activists argue about who was on which committee in 1971, their party in 2026 finds itself structurally embedded in networks linked to an organisation the British government's own Prevent review describes as "ideologically aligned with the Iranian regime"; its deputy leader has been photographed at a pro-IRGC rally; its election campaigns are conducted partly in Urdu and Punjabi using political slogans imported from South Asian communal politics; and its most important new media partner was twice sanctioned by the press regulator for broadcasting unchallenged antisemitic content.

This report attempts to explain how this happened — not as the result of a single conspiracy, but through the convergence of ideological drift, electoral opportunism, and the patient exploitation of Western progressive politics by adversarial state and non-state actors across several decades. The analysis follows a specific intellectual sequence: from the immediate present back through the ideological genealogy of the green movement, through the Russian energy gambit and its exploitation of anti-nuclear ideology, and finally to the deepest historical layer — the recurrent pattern by which Marxist movements have formed tactical alliances with Islamist forces, only to be consumed by them once the common enemy is defeated.

III. The Iran-Aligned NGO Network: The IHRC and Its Satellites

The most acute and documented link between the Green Party leadership and Iran-aligned organisations crystallised on 28 February 2026, when party Deputy Leader Mothin Ali attended a pro-Ayatollah rally in central London. He was not among the thousands of British Iranians who gathered to celebrate the death of Supreme Leader Khamenei following US-Israeli strikes. He was at the opposing protest — defending the regime.

The rally was co-organised by the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC). The significance of this organisation cannot be overstated. The IHRC was established in London in 1997 and has held UN ECOSOC consultative status since 2007 — a legitimising credential it has deployed effectively in international forums. Its stated mission of defending Muslims globally provides it with humanitarian cover, but the internal personnel structure tells a different story.

The Henry Jackson Society's 2019 report, and subsequent reporting by The Times, established that IHRC co-founder and board member Saied Reza Ameli had been appointed Secretary of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution in Iran — one of the most powerful bodies in the Islamic Republic's theocratic governance structure. By 2022, The Times reported that in this capacity Ameli had played a key role in drafting the Iranian government's tougher rules on mandatory hijab wearing — while simultaneously serving as a director of the ostensibly independent IHRC in Britain. The Charity Commission opened a statutory inquiry into the IHRC in October 2025.

The IHRC's chair, Massoud Shadjareh, has publicly praised Hezbollah ('we are all Hezbollah'), called on protesters outside the Israeli Embassy in London to 'fight back,' and described Ayatollah Khomeini as 'a torch of light for the whole of mankind.' The IHRC is the primary organiser of London's annual Al-Quds Day march — an event initiated by Khomeini in 1979, which until 2019 routinely featured the display of Hezbollah flags. The IHRC mourned Khamenei's death in a press release describing him as 'a rare role model… an erudite, principled, spiritual and stoic individual… someone who resisted oppression and stood on the right side of history.'

William Shawcross's 2023 independent review of the Prevent counter-extremism programme described the IHRC as 'an Islamist group ideologically aligned with the Iranian regime, that has a history of extremist links and terrorist sympathies.' This is not a partisan characterisation — it is the formal finding of a government-commissioned review.

The rally Ali attended on 28 February saw protesters chant 'Death to Israel,' 'Death to the IDF,' 'Death to America,' and 'Khamenei you make us proud.' An American flag was stamped on and set alight, as was the lion-and-sun flag symbolising Iranian freedom. Ali subsequently defended his presence on social media, describing himself as 'proudly anti-war.' Green MP Ellie Chowns supported him, characterising his attendance as participation in 'an anti-war protest.'

The IHRC represents the most direct documented link in a broader Iranian influence architecture that operates across the UK. According to the National Union for Democracy in Iran (NUFDI), IRGC-linked institutions operating on British soil include a college affiliated with Al-Mustafa International University (already sanctioned by the United States), which has played a role in radicalisation and recruitment for the IRGC's Quds Force. The Islamic Centre of Britain has a director personally appointed by Khamenei. A Birmingham centre reportedly received UK public funding that was subsequently channelled to IRGC generals Abu Mahdi Al-Mohandis and Qassem Soleimani, both designated terrorists by Western governments.

The scale of this infrastructure is not contested. The UK Parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee, in its July 2025 report drawing on evidence from MI5, MI6, and GCHQ, described Iran as posing a "wide-ranging, persistent and unpredictable threat," with MI5 Director General Ken McCallum reporting that agencies had tracked "more than 20 potentially lethal Iran-backed plots" in the preceding year alone. The ISC's Annual Report covering 2023-2025 noted specifically that "hostile states are increasingly operating through intermediaries" and that the threat includes efforts to exert "covert and malign influence on UK policy, democracy and public opinion." Under the National Security Act 2023, Iran has been designated under the enhanced tier of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme — the most serious designation available, shared only with Russia.

The Green Party's entanglement with this ecosystem is not confined to the single incident of Ali's rally attendance. The Muslim Greens affiliate website explicitly frames the party's membership pitch through Quranic references, positions the Greens as the natural home for Muslim political engagement, and celebrates the party's status as the first UK-wide party to call Israel's actions in Gaza a genocide and to call for the IDF to be proscribed as a terrorist organisation. These are not incidental policy positions — they constitute a deliberate ideological repositioning designed to maximise the party's attractiveness to communities where Islamist-adjacent political narratives have the deepest purchase.

IV. The Pakistan Dimension: Sectarian Electoral Infrastructure

The Pakistan dimension of the Green Party's new political identity is less about formal state linkages than about the deployment of a specific kind of communal political infrastructure — the baradari vote-bank system, South Asian political sloganeering, and the targeting of Pakistani-origin communities through campaign material in their heritage languages — which has historically been the territory of Labour.

The Gorton and Denton by-election of February 2026 was the moment this became impossible to ignore. Green candidate Hannah Spencer's campaign distributed leaflets in Urdu showing her wearing a keffiyeh in front of a mosque, urging voters to 'make Labour pay.' An Urdu-language video linked Reform's candidate Matt Goodwin and Nigel Farage with Donald Trump and ICE deportation raids, cutting to footage of Gaza and then

to Keir Starmer beside India's Narendra Modi. A separate leaflet, also in Urdu, instructed voters: 'Push the falling walls one more time. Labour must be punished for Gaza. Reform must be defeated and Green must be voted for. Vote for the Green Party for a strong Muslim voice.' Campaign material was also produced in Punjabi, Arabic, and Pashto.

Deputy Leader Mothin Ali defended this approach by noting that 'some of the slogans are based off Bangladeshi or Pakistani typical political slogans,' presenting this as inclusive community engagement. Critics pointed out that this translated to conducting a segment of a British general election campaign in languages that 97% of the UK electorate cannot read, using communal solidarity appeals derived from South Asian political traditions that are explicitly about ethnic and religious bloc mobilisation rather than individual civic participation.

The result reinforced the concern. Election observers reported family voting — where one person votes on behalf of multiple household members, almost always male-directed — in 68% of polling stations in Gorton and Denton, affecting 12% of observed voters. The comparable figure for the recent Runcorn by-election was 12% of stations and 1% of voters. Whatever its cause, this statistical anomaly represents a form of democratic participation fundamentally at odds with the secret ballot principle, and it occurred disproportionately in areas where the Greens' sectarian campaign was most concentrated.

The Muslim Vote pressure group, which formally endorsed the Greens, has roots in organisational networks connected to Jamaat-e-Islami-sympathetic elements in the British Pakistani diaspora. Jamaat-e-Islami, founded by Maududi in 1941, is Pakistan's oldest Islamist party and the template for much of subsequent political Islam's organisational methodology. The party's foundational theology holds that sovereignty belongs to God alone and that democratic participation is permissible only insofar as it advances an Islamic state — a position structurally incompatible with the Green Party's stated commitment to secular liberal democracy. Leader Zack Polanski embraced the Muslim Vote's endorsement regardless, stating that 'any organisation that wants to back the Green Party because they align with our values is something that I applaud and welcome.'

The media infrastructure supporting this pivot deserves attention. The party gave a campaign interview to 5Pillars, described by the Jewish News as 'hardline pro-Islamist' and by the Community Security Trust as misusing press regulatory affiliation to lend credibility to extremist narratives. 5Pillars was censured twice by its press regulator IMPRESS — once for a podcast featuring far-right figure Mark Collett that included unchallenged antisemitic content, and once for a podcast featuring Jayda Fransen of Britain First that included unchallenged antisemitic conspiracy theories. After the second ruling, 5Pillars left IMPRESS, stating that the regulator's liberal values conflicted with Islamic norms. The Green Party deleted the interview after controversy but not before it had served its electoral purpose.

V. From Ecology to Ecosocialism: How the Greening Became Grooming

To understand the Green Party's current trajectory requires understanding that this transformation was not imposed from outside overnight. It was the culmination of a decades-long internal evolution that progressively hollowed out the party's environmental core and replaced it with a generic radical-left identity that happened to wear green.

The party originated in 1973 as PEOPLE, founded in Coventry by a small group of professional and business people motivated by Paul Ehrlich's work on overpopulation and ecological limits. It renamed itself the Ecology Party in 1975 and the Green Party in 1985. Its early ideology was genuinely post-ideological in the traditional left-right sense — concerned with sustainability, steady-state economics, and ecological limits rather than class struggle or identity politics. Jonathon Porritt, the party's most significant early figure, articulated a politics of ecological responsibility that drew from neither socialist nor conservative traditions.

The first major pivot came in 1993, when the party adopted its 'Basis for Renewal' programme and explicitly sought to escape its reputation as an environmentalist single-issue party by placing greater emphasis on social policies. This was an understandable strategic response to electoral marginalisation, but it opened a door. Once 'social justice' became a co-equal party value, the Green Party became susceptible to colonisation by the broader radical left, whose version of social justice carried very different ideological freight from anything in the party's founding documents.

By the 2010s, the party's membership had transformed substantially. The original constituency — educated, often rural or suburban, motivated primarily by environmental concern — was joined and increasingly outnumbered by urban progressives for whom climate activism was one expression of a broader politics of anti-capitalism, anti-imperialism, and identity. The party's 2024 election manifesto describes the GPEW as 'a party of social and environmental justice, which supports a radical transformation of society for the benefit of all.' The language of radical transformation rather than sustainable management is significant — it marks the completion of the journey from ecology party to ecosocialist party.

The electoral arithmetic delivered the final push. First-past-the-post is structurally lethal to third parties with dispersed support, and the Greens had spent fifty years in the wilderness. October 7th 2023 and Israel's subsequent campaign in Gaza created something unprecedented: a disengaged, politically activated, highly concentrated bloc of Muslim voters who had abandoned Labour and were looking for a new political home. A February 2024 poll showed 14% of Muslim voters had moved to the Greens and 38% had abandoned Labour altogether. For a party that had spent decades unable to break through electorally, this was not a temptation — it was an existential opportunity.

The Muslim Greens network, founded with just five members in January 2024, grew to over 200 members by late 2025, with multiple Labour Muslim councillors defecting. Mothin Ali's election as Deputy Leader in September 2025 was the institutional crystallisation of this shift — the formal assumption of co-leadership by a figure whose political identity is explicitly constructed around Muslim community representation, Gaza, and

opposition to what he characterises as Western colonial violence. The party's current leader, Zack Polanski, who is Jewish, has described himself as 'not a Zionist' and has called for the arrest of Benjamin Netanyahu.

The structural irony — which the party's secular progressive base appears collectively unable to perceive — is that the communities whose support the Greens are now courting hold social views on gender, sexuality, religious authority, apostasy, and free speech that are diametrically opposed to virtually every other policy in the Green manifesto. The Greens support legalising all drugs, legalising sex work, comprehensive trans rights including puberty blockers, and same-sex marriage. These positions are not peripheral — they are core to the party's identity and have caused significant internal conflict even with the party's secular membership. The idea that these positions are compatible with the values of communities where Jamaat-e-Islami-aligned political thinking is influential requires a degree of cognitive dissonance that can only be sustained by treating the Muslim vote purely instrumentally.

This is the Green Party's information filter — the psychological mechanism through which all available data passes — operating in exactly the way that reflexive control theory predicts. The party sees the electoral opportunity. It does not see the ideological incompatibility, because seeing it would force a choice its electoral desperation cannot afford.

VI. The Russian Energy Gambit: Nuclear Denial as Strategic Weapon

To understand the Green Party's evolution in its full strategic context requires stepping back to examine a parallel process: the deliberate exploitation by Russia of Western anti-nuclear ideology to create continental fossil fuel dependency. This is the layer of the analysis that connects the Green Party's original Russia-adjacent posture to its current Iran-adjacent one — and explains why both can coexist within a single ideological framework.

The evidence for Russian active measures targeting anti-nuclear environmental organisations is not circumstantial. In 2014, then-NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated publicly, at a London think-tank presentation, that Russia 'as part of their sophisticated information and disinformation operations, engaged actively with so-called non-governmental organisations — environmental organisations working against shale gas — to maintain European dependence on imported Russian gas.' He specified that this was based on what allies had reported to him directly.

A formal question raised in the European Parliament in March 2022 stated the matter more bluntly: 'Environmental organisations operating within the EU have, to a large extent, been a cover for Russian lobbying aimed at weakening the EU economically and making member states dependent on Russian energy resources.

These organisations focused on three objectives: fighting nuclear energy development, fighting fossil fuel extraction within the EU including through fracking, and promoting wind and solar at the expense of both.'

The strategic logic was precise and has been vindicated by events. If Western Europe could be persuaded to abandon nuclear power — the only reliable, low-carbon baseload energy source available at scale — while simultaneously blocking domestic gas extraction, the resulting energy gap could only be filled by imported Russian gas. The dependency this created was not accidental. It was the deliberate goal of a decades-long influence operation, and it worked.

Germany is the most thoroughly documented case. The Energiewende policy — driven primarily by Green ideology and the German Greens' absolute anti-nuclear commitment — resulted, after a decade of implementation, in wind and solar delivering only a fraction of Germany's primary energy consumption, while the country imported over half its natural gas from Russia. By 2022, Russia supplied 45% of Europe's gas and 20% of its enriched uranium, and provided technical maintenance for 18 Russian-designed nuclear power plants across the EU. This was the infrastructure of dependency that gave Putin the confidence to invade Ukraine in February 2022, correctly calculating that EU economic self-interest would constrain the Western response.

Greenpeace's own 2022 research documented that Russian energy firms Gazprom, Lukoil and Rosatom had used what the report called 'matryoshka doll' lobbying methods — acting through subsidiaries, joint ventures and industry associations — to influence EU sustainable investment taxonomy, meeting with EU commissioners and senior officials at least 18 times since 2018. This was Russian state capital using commercial and regulatory channels to perpetuate the very dependency that anti-nuclear ideology had created.

The UK Green Party's position within this picture is that of a faithful reproducer of the ideology that served Russian strategic interests, without — as far as the available evidence indicates — any direct coordination with Moscow. This is reflexive control operating at its most efficient. You do not need to control an organisation if you can shape the ideological ecosystem in which it operates so that it arrives at useful positions by itself. The Green Party's anti-nuclear stance, its opposition to Trident, its historical NATO-scepticism, and its anti-fracking advocacy all served Russian strategic interests as faithfully as if they had been commissioned by the FSB. They were not. They were the authentic products of an ideological tradition that was, over time, cultivated and amplified by adversarial actors who recognised their utility.

VII. Patrick Moore and the Road Not Taken

Patrick Moore's reversal on nuclear power — whatever one makes of his subsequent career and the controversy over his precise founding role at Greenpeace — represents the most significant internal challenge to the anti-nuclear consensus from within the environmental movement itself. His position deserves serious engagement precisely because it came from inside.

Moore served for nine years as president of Greenpeace Canada and seven years as a director of Greenpeace International, leaving in 1986. His stated reason was the organisation's abandonment of science and logic in favour of emotion and sensationalism, exemplified by what he regarded as the catastrophic policy error of opposing nuclear energy. As he put it in a PBS interview: 'The only one I have changed my mind over the years is nuclear energy. We made a huge mistake by lumping nuclear energy in with nuclear weapons as if it was an evil technology. Nuclear energy should be lumped in with nuclear medicine. As a beneficial use of nuclear technology. Nuclear energy is one of the safest technologies we have ever built.'

Greenpeace's response to Moore was to attack his credibility and deny his founding status — a response that rather supports his diagnosis of the organisation's relationship with inconvenient evidence. The substantive argument, however, stands independently of the biographical dispute. The safety record of nuclear power, measured in deaths per terawatt-hour of energy produced, is comprehensively superior to every fossil fuel alternative and comparable to or better than solar and wind when full lifecycle analysis is applied. France's electricity grid, approximately 70% nuclear, produces carbon emissions per kilowatt-hour a fraction of Germany's, demonstrating that Moore's position was not merely theoretically sound but practically replicable at national scale.

The road not taken — a European energy policy that had retained and expanded nuclear power rather than abandoning it under green pressure — would have meant no Nord Stream 2, no structural dependency on Russian gas, and therefore a fundamentally different calculus for Putin's Ukraine decision. The counterfactual is not speculative: it is France, which maintained its nuclear fleet and accordingly suffered far less energy vulnerability than Germany in the 2022 crisis. The anti-nuclear campaign, whatever its motivations at the level of individual participants, produced geopolitical consequences of the first order — consequences that benefited Moscow and are still being paid for in Ukrainian lives.

VIII. The KGB, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Architecture of Useful Idiots

The relationship between Soviet intelligence and Islamist movements during the Cold War is one of the most counterintuitive and underappreciated chapters in the history of ideological warfare. The received narrative — atheist communism versus religious fundamentalism — conceals a more complex reality of instrumental manipulation that created the conditions for much of the political violence of the subsequent half-century.

The foundational operation was documented by Ion Mihai Pacepa, the highest-ranking intelligence officer to defect from the Eastern Bloc. In his account, KGB chief Yuri Andropov — who led the organisation from 1967 until becoming Soviet leader in 1982 — launched Operation SIG in 1972 following the humiliation of Soviet-backed Arab states in the 1967 Six-Day War against Israel. The operation sent thousands of agents of influence into the Arab and Islamic world to cultivate anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiment. Some were drawn from

Muslim minorities within the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. The KGB distributed several hundred thousand copies of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion in Arabic. Andropov reportedly described the Islamic world as ‘a petri dish in which the KGB community could nurture a virulent strain of America-hatred, grown from the bacterium of Marxist-Leninist thought.’

The PLO served as the primary transmission mechanism for Soviet disinformation across the Arab world and South Asia. KGB active measures planted articles in the press of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan — arguing that the US was instrumentalising the Soviet-Afghan War, minimising Soviet presence in Afghanistan, and exploiting the Iranian Islamic Revolution as a tool to reshape regional alignments.

The CIA’s parallel engagement with Islamist movements is equally instructive. After World War II, former Nazi intelligence officer Gerhard von Mende’s Islamist cadres — who had fought alongside the Wehrmacht — were repurposed by Western intelligence as Cold War assets. By 1957, CIA operative Robert Dreher had installed Said Ramadan, son-in-law of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna, as a key figure at the Islamic Center in Munich. Ramadan became the principal architect of the Munich mosque as a centre for disseminating Brotherhood ideology across Europe. In 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, the CIA turned more actively to Brotherhood-connected networks in the Mujahideen project. One of their recruits was a Saudi educated by Brotherhood teachers. His name was Osama bin Laden.

Both superpowers thus simultaneously cultivated variants of political Islam as instruments against each other — the Soviets using Shia revolutionary networks and Arab anti-Americanism, the Americans using Brotherhood-connected Sunni networks against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Both created organisms they could not control. The Soviet variant helped produce the conditions for Khomeini’s revolution and the IRGC; the American variant helped produce Al-Qaeda. Neither superpower grasped, until too late, that Islamist movements have their own teleology — one in which secular ideological partners are at best temporary instruments and at worst targets for subsequent elimination.

The lesson that neither Moscow nor Washington learned, and that the UK Green Party has not learned either, is that you cannot instrumentalise a totalising ideological movement without eventually becoming its instrument instead. This is the genius of the arrangement from the Islamist perspective: it requires no deception on their part. The secular partner simply chooses not to read the foundational texts.

IX. Iran 1979: The Classical Template

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 is not merely a historical episode. It is the definitive case study in the pattern that this report argues is now playing out in miniature within British politics — the formation of a revolutionary coalition between secular leftists and Islamists against a common enemy, followed by the systematic elimination of the secular leftists once power is secured.

The revolution was not a purely Islamist uprising. It was what scholars call a ‘negative coalition’ — unity against the Shah, not unity for a shared future. Religious conservatives, liberal nationalists, Marxist guerrillas, student movements, trade unions, the Tudeh Communist Party, and Khomeini’s Islamist network all found themselves fighting the same enemy. The ideological incompatibilities between these groups were profound, but were suppressed during the coalition phase by the overriding imperative of overthrowing the monarchy.

Khomeini’s genius was in understanding and exploiting these incompatibilities. During his Parisian exile he carefully crafted rhetoric that appealed to secular revolutionaries, promising democracy, freedom, and independence from Western imperialism. For the Marxist left, the primary contradiction was not between secularism and religious authority but between imperialism and national sovereignty. Khomeini spoke their language without sharing their values, and they heard what they needed to hear.

The Tudeh Party of Iran — the pro-Soviet Communist Party — made the fatal strategic error of adopting the Stalinist ‘two-stage theory of revolution’: the progressive national bourgeoisie must first lead a bourgeois-democratic revolution, which Marxists support, before the second socialist stage can follow. The progressive national bourgeoisie, in the Tudeh’s analysis, was Khomeini and the clergy. The party grew to hundreds of thousands of members after the revolution and channelled its organisational capacity entirely into supporting a theocratic movement whose foundational doctrine — the absolute sovereignty of God as interpreted by the jurist-guardian (velayat-e faqih) — was the precise negation of everything Marxism stood for.

The purge followed a predictable sequence. By February 1979 the Shah had fallen. By November 1979 the liberal Prime Minister Bazargan had been forced out. From 1981, the IRGC — the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, created specifically as a theocratic praetorian force independent of the regular military — systematically dismantled the secular left. The Tudeh Party, which had been unswervingly loyal to Khomeini’s line even through the Iran-Iraq war, was the last to be crushed, in 1983. Their leaders were arrested, tortured, and forced to make Soviet-style televised confessions. 18 Soviet diplomats were expelled from Iran for ‘blatant interference.’ In 1988, thousands of political prisoners — including the remnants of every leftist organisation that had helped make the revolution — were executed in one of the largest anti-communist massacres in modern history.

Scholar Gilles Kepel described Khomeini’s method as first exposing his erstwhile supporters to power, then sapping it away ‘through the komitehs, revolutionary guards, and other organs controlled by his networks.’ This was not improvised — it was the deliberate architectural strategy of a political intelligence that understood perfectly that the secular left was a scaffolding to be used and discarded, not a partner to be accommodated.

The deeper irony — to which this report’s title alludes — is that the Soviet Union, whose Tudeh proxy had helped bring Khomeini to power, simultaneously worked with the new Iranian government to develop its nuclear capabilities, even as that government described the Soviets as ‘atheistic devils’ and executed Soviet intelligence’s domestic assets. Both sides understood the transaction perfectly and pursued it with clear eyes. The Marxists who fought and bled for the revolution were not so clear-eyed, and they paid with their lives.

X. Convergence: Where the Russian and Iranian Threads Meet in Contemporary Britain

The preceding sections have traced two parallel historical processes: the Russian exploitation of anti-nuclear green ideology to create European fossil fuel dependency, and the Soviet-era cultivation of Islamist movements as instruments of anti-Western disinformation. What makes the current moment analytically significant is that these two threads are converging in contemporary Britain — and the UK Green Party sits at their intersection.

The convergence is not inferential. It is documented.

Russia and Iran are now de facto strategic allies with a deepening military relationship. Since the start of the Ukraine war in 2022, Iran has supplied Russia with thousands of UAVs, guided aerial bombs, and close-range ballistic missiles used against Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure. Russia has reciprocated with unprecedented defence cooperation including missiles, electronics, and air defence systems. In September 2024, the UK, France, and Germany issued a joint statement condemning Iran's transfer of ballistic missiles to Russia, describing it as "a direct threat to European security." The UK subsequently imposed sanctions on Iran Air and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines for their role in supporting Russia's war. Iran has been designated under the enhanced tier of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme, sharing this distinction only with Russia — the two states the UK government considers its most acute foreign influence threats.

In the information domain, the convergence around the Israel-Hamas conflict is comprehensively documented. The Institute for Strategic Dialogue, monitoring hundreds of state-affiliated accounts from Iran, Russia, and China since October 7th 2023, found that all three states were "exploiting the crisis to advance their geopolitical agenda" — with Iranian accounts glorifying Hamas attacks as "strategic blows against neo-colonial powers," Russian accounts simultaneously pushing narratives about Ukraine supplying weapons to Hamas (false), and both states amplifying anti-American, anti-Western sentiment through the same conflict. ISD's further research documented a pro-Kremlin ad network, likely associated with the known Doppelganger disinformation campaign, explicitly using Israel-Hamas narratives to undermine European support for Ukraine in France and Germany. The operational confluence is not coincidental — both states benefit from the same information environment: one in which Western publics are polarised over Gaza, sceptical of their governments' foreign policy commitments, and receptive to anti-American narratives.

A UK Green Party that campaigns against Trident, against NATO membership, against nuclear energy, and whose deputy leader attends pro-IRGC rallies co-organised by a body with direct personnel links to Tehran's Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, is serving the strategic interests of both Moscow and Tehran simultaneously — regardless of whether anyone inside the party has ever had a conscious conversation with either government.

This is reflexive control at scale. The Green Party has not been 'turned' by Moscow or Tehran. It has been cultivated — its authentic pacifism, anti-capitalism, post-colonial sympathies, and electoral desperation have been allowed to ripen into a configuration that serves adversarial interests without any of the participants necessarily being aware of it. As one academic analysis of the theory puts it, successful reflexive control

“requires a deep study of the enemy’s inner nature” — the identification of existing beliefs that, correctly amplified, will produce desired outcomes autonomously. The Green Party has not been controlled. It has been *understood*, and left to develop accordingly.

The Iranian influence architecture in Britain operates through three documented tiers. The first is the IHRC and associated Shia Islamist organisations with direct personnel links to the Iranian state. The second is a broader network of cultural centres, academic institutions, and mosques that, according to NUFDI, serve as ‘propaganda hubs’ for IRGC-aligned ideology. The third is the broader ecosystem of British Muslim political organisations, media outlets, and campaign groups, some of which overlap with the first two tiers and some of which do not, but all of which are being mobilised through the single unifying issue of Palestine/Gaza in ways that serve Iranian strategic narratives about Western imperialism and the necessity of armed resistance.

The Green Party has inserted itself into this ecosystem with increasing deliberateness since 2023. The process accelerated following October 7th and has not been reversed despite multiple warning signals: Mothin Ali’s post-October-7 posts using Hamas framing; the party’s formal decision to describe Israeli actions as genocide and to call for the IDF’s proscription; the promotion and deletion of the 5Pillars interview; Ali’s IRGC rally attendance. At each juncture, party leadership either defended the action or provided insufficient challenge to constitute a credible deterrent.

The Gorton and Denton result — the Green Party’s first ever Westminster by-election victory, achieved through an unprecedented deployment of communal sectarian campaign infrastructure — will have the effect of reinforcing rather than moderating this trajectory. Electoral success is its own argument within a political party, and the party’s strategists will have identified a replicable model for winning in Muslim-majority constituencies that requires continued alignment with Islamist-adjacent networks.

XI. The Pattern and Its Trajectory

The structural logic of the Marxist-Islamist alliance and its inevitable dissolution has been demonstrated empirically enough times — in Iran, in Afghanistan, in the experience of leftist parties in Egypt, Algeria and Turkey — to constitute something close to an historical law. The pattern operates because the two partners in the coalition have fundamentally incompatible ultimate objectives, which they suppress during the anti-imperialist coalition phase in favour of the shared tactical objective of defeating the common enemy.

The Marxist typically sees the Islamist as a progressive national bourgeois force that can be instrumentalised in a first revolutionary stage before socialism supersedes religion. The Islamist sees the Marxist as technically skilled, organisationally capable, internationally connected, and dispensable — useful idiots who provide street muscle and intellectual legitimacy until the Islamic state is sufficiently consolidated to dispense with atheists.

What makes the current UK situation different from the classical pattern is that it is playing out more slowly, within democratic institutions, and at a lower intensity of violence. The UK Green Party's secular progressive base is not going to be executed. But the structural dynamic is recognisably similar: a coalition of convenience between secular leftists and Islamist-aligned networks, united by shared opposition to Western foreign policy and conservative domestic politics, in which the two partners have fundamentally different long-term objectives and are at different stages of their respective agendas.

The question that nobody in the Green Party leadership appears to be asking is: what happens when Muslim Greens become a parliamentary majority within the party rather than a valued minority? The dynamics of this pattern have played out before in British political institutions, producing in each case the subordination of party structures to communal political interests, the intimidation of dissenting voices, and the systematic prioritisation of sectarian over civic identity. The Greens' secular progressive base might consider that the communities whose votes they are now courting regard drug legalisation, sex work decriminalisation, trans rights, and same-sex marriage not as peripheral policy disagreements but as affronts to divine law.

There are additional long-term concerns that the convergence of Russian and Iranian strategic interests in Britain's political landscape raises. The anti-Trident, anti-NATO positions that the Green Party has maintained since its founding serve Russian strategic interests directly at a moment when European security architecture is under its most acute stress since the Cold War. The party's anti-nuclear energy policy, if ever enacted, would deepen rather than resolve the fossil fuel dependency that made the Ukraine invasion possible. And the party's de facto alliance with IRGC-adjacent networks in Britain means that, as Iranian influence operations in the UK intensify — the ISC's 2025 report described a security environment "more threatening than at any point in recent decades" — there is a parliamentary party whose leadership has demonstrated willingness to participate in IRGC-adjacent political events and whose internal direction of travel makes further such participation increasingly likely.

None of this requires that anyone in the Green Party is consciously acting as an agent of foreign powers. The most dangerous useful idiots are always the sincere ones.

XII. Conclusions

This report has traced a path from the immediate — the presence of a Green Party deputy leader at a pro-IRGC rally in February 2026 — through the recent past of deliberate sectarian electoral strategy in Gorton and Denton, back through the decades-long transformation of a genuine environmental movement into an ecosocialist vehicle, through the Russian exploitation of anti-nuclear ideology as a strategic weapon, and finally to the deepest historical layer: the recurrent pattern of Marxist-Islamist tactical alliances and their invariable destruction of the Marxist partner. The organising logic throughout is reflexive control — the shaping of an adversary's information environment so that they arrive at strategically useful positions autonomously.

The conclusions that emerge are as follows:

1. The transformation is structural, not incidental. The Green Party's current trajectory is not the result of a few bad decisions or individual bad actors. It is the culmination of a decades-long ideological evolution that progressively replaced environmental science with radical social justice politics, creating the ideological infrastructure for the current configuration.

2. The grooming was both external and internal. Russian active measures exploited authentic anti-nuclear sentiment; Iranian influence networks exploit authentic anti-war and pro-Palestinian sentiment. Neither created these sentiments — they amplified and redirected them. The Green Party's own electoral desperation and ideological flexibility made it susceptible.

3. The reflexive control mechanism does not require coordination. The convergence of Russian and Iranian strategic benefit from Green Party positions does not depend on any direct communication between those states and any Green Party actor. It depends only on the shaping of an ideological ecosystem in which the party arrives at useful positions by itself. This is both the most dangerous form of foreign influence and the hardest to counter, because no individual actor is knowingly complicit.

4. The Patrick Moore lesson has not been learned. The abandonment of nuclear power under green political pressure was, as events in Ukraine have demonstrated definitively, a strategic catastrophe of the first order. The continued opposition to nuclear energy by the UK Greens and their Greenpeace ideological allies perpetuates a vulnerability that serves Russian strategic interests directly.

5. The historical pattern warns against the current coalition. The Marxist-Islamist alliance has been tried and has failed — from the Tudeh Party's support for Khomeini to the CIA's cultivation of the Mujahideen — in every case producing results that neither partner intended and that the secular progressive partner paid for most dearly. There is no reason to expect the current variant to be different.

6. The Russia-Iran strategic alignment in Britain is not coincidental. Both states are formally designated as the UK's primary foreign influence threats. Both benefit, in documented and converging ways, from a parliamentary party that is anti-NATO, anti-nuclear, and embedded in IRGC-adjacent networks. Whether this convergence reflects coordination or simply the alignment of adversarial incentives is less important than recognising its reality and its implications for British security.

7. Democratic institutions have limited defences against this kind of slow-motion capture. The mechanisms being deployed — electoral participation, community organisation, media networks, charitable foundations — are all formally legitimate. The concern is not that any individual actor is breaking the law. It is that the cumulative effect of these activities, coordinated around adversarial strategic objectives, is reshaping a parliamentary party in ways that serve those objectives. This is precisely the kind of threat that existing counter-extremism and counter-influence frameworks are poorly equipped to address.

The Monty Python comparison with which this report's introduction opened is not merely comic. The People's Front of Judea's consuming preoccupation with who sits on the committee, at the expense of any engagement

with the reality of Roman occupation, is precisely the failure mode that the Green Party's founding-dispute obsession exemplifies. While senior figures argue about who was on which boat in 1971, their party's deputy leader is photographed at rallies defending the theocratic regime that executed every communist who helped it into power. Rome, one might say, is burning. The committee is still in session.

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